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Abstract  
This paper examines the effect of economic policy on air quality using US quarterly data 
from 1973 to 2013. In particular, we analyze the short-run as well as the long-run 
interactions between fiscal and monetary policy with CO2 emissions, employing time series 
techniques of co-integration, Granger multivariate causality and vector error-correction 
modeling. To take into account possible variations of the effect of economic policy 
according to the sources of pollution, we distinguish between industrial and residential 
inflicted CO2 emissions. In addition, we construct the impulse responses to three linear 
combinations of fiscal shocks, corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit-spending, 
deficit-financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion. Policy implications 
from the results vary depending on the source of CO2 emissions. 
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1. Introduction 
A large part of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in many countries, worldwide, is 
being spent by governments, subsequently determining many macroeconomic variables and 
welfare in general. Furthermore, in response to the world economic crisis that initiated in 
2008, many governments around the world have followed expansionary macroeconomic 
policy to support and accelerate the recovery of their economies. A number of studies has 
recently suggested that fiscal spending is also a significant determinant of environmental 
pollution (Lopez et al., 2011, Islam and Lopez, 2013; Halkos and Paizanos, 2013; Galinato 
and Islam, 2014; Lopez and Palacios, 2014). The theoretical underpinnings of the interaction 
mechanisms between fiscal spending, environmental quality, and economic welfare have 
been analyzed in papers by Heyes (2000), Lawn (2003) and Sim (2006). Furthermore, it is 
possible that the size of government revenues as well as monetary policy also have an 
important role in the determination of environmental quality.  
Regardless of the evidence that macroeconomic policy may be a significant 
determinant of environmental quality, this correlation has not been considered 
comprehensively in the existing literature. On one hand, countries with a large fiscal sector 
are more probable to have undertaken redistributive payments that enhance equality of 
income that may in turn lead to greater demand of enhanced environmental quality. In 
addition, according to Frederik and Lundstrom (2001), if the environment is considered to be 
a luxury public good it may only be demanded only after more necessary public needs have 
been addressed, which is more like to occur in countries with greater size of government 
spending.  
 It is important to note that the mechanisms through which fiscal spending affect 
environmental pollution differ regarding to the source of pollution i.e. whether the pollution 
is production or consumption generated (McAusland, 2008). For the former, Lopez et al. 
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(2011) recognize four different mechanisms through which a larger level of government 
expenditure may determine environmental quality. First of all, as already mentioned 
increased income enhances the demand for reduced environmental pollution (income effect). 
Furthermore, increased fiscal spending fosters activities that require human capital rather 
that physical capital which is more detrimental to the environment (composition effect), 
while increased labor efficiency also tends to reduce environmental pollution (technique 
effect). Depending on the relationship between fiscal spending and economic growth, 
increased government expenditure may lead to greater pollution levels in some levels of 
GDP (scale effect), according to the shape of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Grossman 
and Krueger, 1995).  
Concerning consumption generated pollution, according to Lopez et al. (2008) fiscal 
spending on sectors like health and education increases consumers’ current and future 
income and thus may lead to an improvement of environmental quality (income effect). 
Moreover, government expenditure leads to the establishment and enforcement of 
appropriate environmental regulations that in turn may lead to the development of 
institutions that enhance environmental quality (Fullerton and Kim, 2008) particularly in 
democratic economies which are more likely to adopt stricter environmental rules compared 
to non-democratic administrations (Galinato and Islam, 2014). Finally, increased public 
spending may promote investment on and use of public transportation that is considered to 
impose less environmental pressures compared to than private means of transportation 
(Zinmerman, 2005 and Islam and Lopez, 2014). 
The existent empirical literature offers indeterminate evidence on the estimated 
effect of fiscal spending on pollution. Considering production generated pollution Bernauer 
and Koubi (2006) find that an increase in fiscal spending raises emissions, while the quality 
of governance does not significantly affect this relationship. On the other hand, Frederik and 
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Lundstrom (2001) report that higher levels of economic freedom are associated with smaller 
pollution levels when the initial government size is small but increases pollution levels when 
the initial size is large. Lopez et al. (2011) concentrate on the significance of the 
composition of public spending on the environment i.e. the percentage of public goods on 
fiscal spending. They find that increasing the share of public goods in total government 
spending reduces emission levels.  
Furthermore, they report that changes in total government spending, with its 
composition remaining constant, reduces environmental pollution but the result is 
insignificant in some specifications. In a similar study, Lopez and Palacios (2010) analyze 
the importance of fiscal spending and environmental taxes on the pollution levels in 
European countries reporting a negative effect of the former on the latter, independently of 
the composition structure of public spending. Regarding consumption based pollution Islam 
and Lopez (2013) as well as Gallinato and Islam (2014) report that an increase of the share 
of social and public goods in total government expenditure enhances environmental quality, 
particularly for governments that have constitute democratic regimes.  
Taking into account this theoretical and empirical background, the purpose of the 
present study is to investigate how macroeconomic policy affects air pollution. The 
contribution of this paper is the more specific examination of the effects of fiscal policy, 
taking into consideration three different implementation scenarios, as well as those of 
monetary policy on environmental quality for the first time. To accomplish this we employ 
vector autoregression methods, employing a sample of quarterly data for the US economy, 
covering the period 1973-2013 for CO2, distinguishing between production- and 
consumption-generated sources of the pollutant. We estimate the model by using a Vector 
Autoregression Model, to take into account dynamics in the analyzed relationships.  
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The next section describes the data employed in the empirical analysis and section 3 
presents the suggested econometric methods. The empirical estimated are reported next 
while the last section presents the conclusions and describes policy implications of the 
results.  
2. Data 
The sample we use to estimate the model consists of quarterly data for 12 
macroeconomic and environmental variables for the period 1973-2013, for the US economy. 
There are 164 observations per variable. Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009) the 
macroeconomic policy variables used are Total Government Expenditure, Total Government 
Revenue and Interest Rate while additional macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic 
Product, Private Consumption, Real Wages, Adjusted Reserves, Private Non-Residential 
Investment, PPIC and GDP deflator are employed. All macroeconomic variables are derived 
from the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the environmental and macroeconomic policy variables, 
1973:1 – 2013:4 
 
 CO2IC CO2RTC RBPEXP RBPREV FFRT 
 Mean  2.779  3.239  4.298  3.796  5.754 
 Median  2.796  3.241  4.287  3.750  5.460 
 Maximum  3.131  3.329  4.623  4.280  17.78 
 Minimum  2.399  3.099  3.993  3.188  0.070 
 Std. Dev.  0.175  0.047  0.193  0.234  3.911 
 Coef. of Var.  0.063  0.015  0.045  0.062  0.680 
 Observations  164  164  164  164  164 
Note: All variables are in logarithms except the interest rate where the level has been used.  
 
The CO2 data are from the US Environmental Protection Agency and are 
distinguished in two categories according to their resources, namely production-generated 
emissions (industrial - CO2IC) and residential and transport (i.e. consumption generated 
emissions - CO2RTC). It is important to study both consumption and production generated 
pollution since, as already mentioned, the mechanisms through which fiscal spending affects 
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environmental quality are different and the estimated effect is possibly different both 
qualitatively and in magnitude.    
The descriptive statistics of the environmental and macroeconomic policy variables of 
the model for the period 1973 to 2013 are presented in Table 1. It is interesting to note that 
the mean value of the CO2RTC is higher than that of CO2IC depicting the fact that residential 
and transport activities are a relatively greater source of pollution. On the other hand, CO2IC 
emissions’ variability is larger as shown by the coefficients of variation. Regarding the 
macroeconomic policy variables we observe that the average value of government spending 
is greater than that of government revenue, implying that on average the US government 
followed a deficit financed spending policy. Finally, the interest rate variable is characterized 
by large volatility. Figure 1 depicts these relationships.       
Figure 1: Government expenditure, CO2IC and CO2RTC emissions, 1973:1 – 2013:4 
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3. Methodology 
We initially estimate a typical Vector Autoregression Model which may be presented 
as: 






+
















++













+













+





=





−
−
−
−
−
−
t
t
pt
pt
pp
pp
t
t
t
t
t
t u
Y
X
Y
X
Y
X
Y
X
νββ
ββ
ββ
ββ
ββ
ββ
α
α
)(
22
)(
21
)(
12
)(
11
2
2
)2(
22
)2(
21
)2(
12
)2(
11
1
1
)1(
22
)1(
21
)1(
12
)1(
11
0,2
0,1
....  
 7 
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where Zt is a vector including the system variables; β1, β2, ….βp are parameters; α is the 
deterministic element of the VAR model; et is the vector of random errors distributed with 
zero mean and Ω variance matrix. If the variables are non-stationary but are integrated of 
order 1 [i.e. I(1)] and co-integrated then a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) should be 
employed instead. The VECM restricts the long-run behavior of the endogenous variables to 
converge to their co-integrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment 
dynamics and the deviation from the long-term equilibrium is gradually corrected by the co-
integration term. 
 For constructing the impulse responses we use the Generalized Impulse Responses 
approach which unlike the conventional impulse response method typically employs a 
Cholesky decomposition of the positive definite covariance matrix of the shocks; the 
advantage of the generalized impulse response analysis is that it does not require 
orthogonalization of shocks. Since the resulting impulse responses are invariant to the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR, this approach gives unique and robust results. We then 
estimate bootstrap confidence intervals that allow us to identify the significance of the 
reported effects.   
Furthermore, we employ an alternative identification method using sign restrictions, 
as proposed by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). This identification method handles several 
issues that often occur when using vector autoregressions to identify policy shocks. First of 
all, there is the issue of separating changes in variables that are the result of actual fiscal 
policy shocks as opposed to those that capture the variability of fiscal variables in response to 
the business cycle shocks. Then, there is the difficulty of defining a fiscal policy shock since 
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unlike monetary policy that usually refers to a change in interest rates, there are many 
different ways that fiscal policy may be implemented. Finally, the fact that there is usually a 
delay between the planning and implementation of fiscal policies may cause movements in 
macroeconomic variables that do not relate to the actual implementation of the former.  
To solve the first issue we identify monetary policy and business cycle shocks that are 
orthogonal to a fiscal policy shock, separating the automatic responses of fiscal variables to 
those shocks. For the second problem, we consider fiscal policy shocks that range between a 
government spending and a government revenue shock, or any linear combination of those 
like balanced budget expansionary policies. To deal with announcement effect we restrict the 
behaviour of impulse responses, by imposing the restriction that the macroeconomic and 
environmental variables of interest do not respond for a one year period and only then begin 
to vary for a specified period.  
To enhance the identifying power of the model we restrict responses for four quarters 
after the initial shock ruling out short-term changes in government expenditure that do not 
constitute part of a specific fiscal policy. However, to avoid any bias in the estimated results,   
it is important to note that there are no sign restrictions imposed on the reaction of the 
environmental variables. 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Granger causality tests between CO2 emissions 
and the macroeconomic variables as well as per capita income. In performing the tests, 2 lags 
were used in the regressions since this is the optimal number of lags in the VAR model as 
indicated by the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criteria (SC)
1
. We reject the 
hypothesis that RBPEXP does not Granger cause CO2IC but the same does not hold for 
CO2RTC. However, there is evidence that government expenditure is caused by changes in 
                                                          
1
 For details see Halkos (2006, 2011). 
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emissions of the latter sources. One plausible explanation for that is that since CO2RTC 
emissions are greater than CO2IC government expenditure responds to variations in 
emissions from these sources.  
On the other hand, government revenue affects both CO2IC and CO2RTC levels 
however, is not caused by any of them. Interestingly, monetary policy proxied by the interest 
rate does not affect either pollutants’ emission levels but seems to be preceded by variations 
in industrial CO2 emissions. Finally, there is support for a bivariate causal relationship 
between CO2IC and per capita income, while there seems to be no relationship between GDP 
and CO2RTC emissions. This depicts the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) relationship 
between GDP and pollution levels. Specifically, for high income countries, like the United 
States, there is evidence in the literature of a large effect of GDP on production generated 
pollution but the curve is rather flat in the relationship with consumption generated pollution 
(Halkos, 2003 and Martinez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-Morancho, 2003).             
Before turning to the estimation of the vector autoregression model we check the time 
series properties of all the variables employed in our analysis. To accomplish that we use 
stationariy tests like the Phillips-Perron (PP) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, 
reported in table 3.   
The ADF test is based on the following data generation process: 
+=∆ aX t   tjt
p
j
jt XX εγγ +∆+ −
−
=
− ∑
1
1
1  
tjt
p
j
jtt XXX εγγβα +∆++Τ+=∆ −
−
=
− ∑
1
1
1  
The term ∆ is the first differences operator; the variable that is examined is symbolized by Xt; 
t depicts time and T is the linear trend; the lag order is expressed by p; and the white noise 
error term is sympbolized by εt ; We report two processes with intercept as well as with 
intercept and trend. We test the hypothesis that H0: γ=0 against its alternative that γ≠0 
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comparing the estimated τ-values with the critical values of the MacKinnon tables and with 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable under consideration does not have a unit root. 
On the other hand if the variable is found to be stationary in first differences, it is integrated 
of order one i.e. I(1). Finally, application of the Phillips-Perron test takes into account higher 
order serial correlation, while the choice of the optimum number of lags used is based on an 
application of the Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) criteria. 
   Table 2: Granger Causality tests of bivariate relationships 
  CO2IC CO2RTC 
Variables  F statistic Probability F statistic Probability 
RBPEXP does not Granger Cause CO2 4.713 0.010**  0.198 0.820 
CO2 does not Granger Cause RBPEXP 0.163 0.849  3.284 0.040** 
RBPREV does not Granger Cause CO2 5.949 0.003***  3.864 0.023** 
CO2 does not Granger Cause RBPREV 0.447 0.639  0.896 0.410 
FFRT does not Granger Cause CO2 2.017 0.136  0.510 0.601 
CO2 does not Granger Cause FFRT 4.320 0.014**  0.398 0.671 
RGDPC does not Granger Cause CO2 21.56 0.000***  2.038 0.133 
CO2 does not Granger Cause RGDPC 5.579 0.004***  1.399 0.249 
**Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%. 
 
   Table 3: Unit root ADF and Phillips-Perron tests – Quarterly data 1973:1 – 2013:4 
   ADF Phillips-Perron 
Variables Deterministic Level Difference Level Difference 
CO2IC  Intercept 0.718 0.000 0.693 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.383 0.000 0.337 0.000 
CO2RTC Intercept 0.347 0.000 0.096 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.698 0.000 0.292 0.000 
RBPEXP
 
Intercept 0.675 0.005 0.796 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.424 0.021 0.806 0.000 
RBPREV
 
Intercept 0.346 0.000 0.216 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.090 0.000 0.294 0.000 
FFRT Intercept 0.376 0.000 0.451 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.013 0.000 0.067 0.000 
RGDPC  Intercept 0.815 0.000 0.787 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.784 0.000 0.791 0.000 
RCON Intercept 0.674 0.000 0.729 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.920 0.000 0.934 0.000 
RNRESIN
V 
Intercept 0.589 0.000 0.652 0.000 
 Trend and intercept 0.945 0.000 0.957 0.000 
   Note: All values reported are probabilities. 
 
In all levels there is no evidence of stationarity in levels and all the time series used 
are integrated of order one at the conventional 5% significance level (Table 3). If the 
variables are also cointegrated we may proceed with the estimation of the Vector Error 
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Correction Model (VECM). For that reason we first run the Johansen cointegration test (see 
Table 4) to determine the number of cointegrating relations, assuming that all trends are 
stochastic.  
                     Table 4: Johansen Cointegration test 
  Trace test Max Eigenvalue 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Trace 
Statistic 
Probability Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
Probability 
H0: r = 0  210.563  0.000***  54.183  0.032** 
H0: r≤ 1   156.379  0.000***  47.567  0.035** 
H0: r≤ 2  108.812  0.004***  35.988  0.134 
H0: r≤ 3  72.824  0.028**  27.685  0.228 
H0: r≤ 4  45.138  0.088*  19.569  0.371 
 
The first column shows the number of cointegrating relations under the null 
hypothesis. The first block reports the trace statistics and the second block reports the 
maximum eigenvalue statistics. To determine the number of cointegrating relations 
conditional on the assumptions made about the trend, we can proceed sequentially until we 
fail to reject. The trace statistic indicates 3 cointegrating equations, while the maximum 
eigenvalue statistic indicates 1 cointegrating equation. Hence, following the most 
conservative statistic, we estimate the VECM assuming 1 cointegrating equation. In addition, 
performance of the AIC and SC criteria combined with an application of the Portmanteau 
Autocorrelation Test showed that the preferable length of lags for the model is 2. Finally, the 
estimated VAR is stable (stationary) since all roots have modulus less than one and lie inside 
the unit circle. 
The error correction term, that represents the adjustment towards long run 
equilibrium, is statistically significant in both the environmental variables’ equations and in 
most of the other cases implying long-run causality. The forecast error variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions analysis are key to analyzing the estimated 
results. The impulse response functions depict the way a series respond to an innovation in 
another variable or itself over time. These innovations of the variables are captured by shocks 
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in the error terms of the model’s equations. To ensure that the innovations are orthogonal to 
the ordering of the VAR we construct Generalized Impulses (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). The 
generalized impulse responses are depicted in Figures 2 and 3.    
 
Figure 2: Impulse responses of CO2IC to (a) RBPEXP, (b) RBPREVN, (c) FFRT and (d) GDPc  
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After a one Standard Deviation (S.D.) increase of government expenditure, 
production generated CO2 pollution declines after arriving at a peak of -0.012 in 6 quarters 
and then remains constant at about -0.011.  On the other hand, CO2IC declines after a 1 S.D. 
shock of tax cuts, meaning that a decline of RBPREV reduces production generated CO2 
emissions which reaches a maximum of -0.008 after 2 quarters. However, from the 5
th
 quarter 
onwards this effect is not statistically significant. Regarding monetary policy, following a 
decrease of the interest rate, CO2IC, slightly falls on impact and then begins to rise after the 
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8
th
 quarter stabilizing at -0.012. Finally, CO2IC starts increasing after a positive shock in 
income but this effect is significant only until the 3
rd
 quarter. 
 
Figure 3: Impulse responses of CO2RTC to (a) RBPEXP, (b) RBPREVN, (c) FFRT and (d) GDPc  
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Regarding consumption generated CO2 emissions a one S.D. increase of government 
expenditure has no effect, while the same is also true for a shock in government revenue, 
monetary policy and per capita income.  
In general, the effect of macroeconomic policy is greater, in significance and absolute 
values, on production generated pollution compared to that on consumption generated 
pollution, a result that is in line with other recent studies (Halos and Pianos, 2013; Islam and 
Lopez, 2013).  The reason of the difference in the significance and magnitude of the 
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estimated effects of fiscal policy on CO2IC and CO2RTC depends on the mechanisms 
through which different types of pollutants respond to these policies.  
The forecast error variance decomposition is shown in Figure 4. According to the 
results government expenditure explains more than 15% of CO2IC emissions fluctuations, 
while only 1% of CO2RTC variability. Concerning government revenue shocks they explain 
about 4.5% and 1.9% of the fluctuations in CO2IC and CO2RTC respectively. Finally, 
monetary policy shocks explain a much larger percentage of CO2IC fluctuations rather than 
of CO2RTC. It is interesting to note that the importance of GDPC in explaining fluctuation in 
emission levels is lower than that of government expenditure, particularly for CO2IC. 
4.1 Policy analysis 
In taking into examination the effects of fiscal policy shocks and following the 
methodology proposed by Mount ford and Hulling (2009), we consider different fiscal policy 
shocks as different linear combinations of the basic fiscal policy shocks, focusing on three 
fiscal policies that are often used, namely a deficit financed tax cut, a balanced budget 
spending and a deficit expenditure shock. But it has to be clear that other scenarios of interest 
may be analysed in this way as well. By denoting raja (k) as the response at horizon k of 
variable j to the impulse vector a, then the above policy requires that 
     0.01 = ))()(( ,
0
, jBGRGSj
k
j
BGSGS BGRjkrBGSjkr −+−∑
=
    for Kk ,...0=  
     0 = ))()(( ,
0
, jBGRGRj
k
j
BGSGR BGRjkrBGSjkr −+−∑
=
    for Kk ,...0=  
Where K = 4, GS and GO represent government expenditure and government revenue 
respectively, and Bags and Bagri are correspondingly the scale of the standard basic 
government spending and revenue shocks in period j.  
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 Figure 4: Variance decomposition of the the environmental variables  
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Figure 5: The deficit-financed tax cut policy scenario where government revenue is reduced 
by 1% for one year while government expenditure remains unchanged.  
 
 
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions for a tax cut financed by deficit. The 
policy scenario is designed as a sequence of basic fiscal shocks such that tax revenues are 
reduced by 1% and government expenditure is constant for four one year after the first shock. 
The tax cut initially decreases CO2IC emissions but starting from the 5
th
 quarter and until the 
 16 
20 quarter production generated pollution significantly increases. For CO2RTC there is a 
reduction on impact and on the 1
st
 quarter, however there is a significant positive impact from 
the 5
th
 to the 21
st
 quarter.   
 
Figure 6: The deficit spending policy scenario where government expenditure is raised by 
1% for one year with government revenues remaining constant. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The balanced budget policy scenario where government expenditure is increased 
by 1% for one year and government revenues raised so that the increased returns are 
equivalent to the increased spending. 
 
 
The impulse responses for a deficit spending fiscal policy scenario are depicted in 
Figure 6. This policy scenario combines the basic fiscal shocks in such a way that fiscal 
expenditure rises by 1% and tax revenues are constant for one year. The deficit spending 
scenario reduces production and consumption generated CO2 emissions during the first seven 
and three quarters respectively, however the effect is much smaller in the latter. 
Finally, the balanced budget expenditure policy requires both tax returns and 
government spending to rise in such a way that the increase in returns and spending is 
equalized for each quarter for one year period (Figure 7).  These show that instantly there is a 
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relatively important reduction effect on both production and consumption generated pollution 
which lasts until the 12
th
 and 16
th
 quarters respectively and then ceases to be significant.  
The effects of the three policy scenarios are summarized in Table 5. Even though, the 
greatest decrease of emissions from both sources, occur after a quarter in the deficit spending 
policy scenario, this policy deteriorates environmental quality in the mid-term period. Thus, 
assuming that the enhancement of environmental quality constitutes a priority there is 
evidence that a spending expansion is preferable and in particular a balanced budget 
expenditure increase is the preferable expansionary fiscal due to it having a more sustainable 
effect. Once more, there is evidence that following a spending expansion, the decrease of 
CO2 emissions from production sources is greater in absolute values than for those emissions 
that are considered to be consumption generated.         
                
Table 5: Effect of the fiscal policy scenarios on environmental variables 
 1 qrt 4 qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Minimum Maximum 
CO2Ic        
Deficit-financed tax cut -0.24* -0.01 0.56* 0.58* 0.36* -0.24* (qrt 1) 0.61* (qrt 10) 
Deficit Spending -1.18* -0.59* -0.20 0.07 0.21 -1.18* (qrt 1) 0.24 (qrt 22) 
Balanced Budget -0.91* -0.58* -0.73* -0.48* -0.04 -0.91* (qrt 1) 0.07 (qrt 24) 
CO2RTc        
Deficit-financed tax cut -0.08* 0.09 0.26* 0.31* 0.21* -0.08* (qrt 1) 0.31* (qrt 12) 
Deficit Spending -0.54* -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.78* (qrt 0) 0.08 (qrt 24) 
Balanced Budget -0.46* -0.21 -0.29* -0.30* -0.24 -0.70* (qrt 0) -0.13 (qrt 24) 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
This paper, employing quarterly data for the US economy for the period 1973 - 2013 
and using vector autoregressions, examines the effect of macroeconomic policy on pollution. 
The results confirm the existence of a correlation between fiscal expenditure and pollution 
that has been identified in recent theoretical and empirical studies. In addition, it provides for 
the first time evidence regarding the relationship between monetary policy and environmental 
degradation. We report a significantly negative effect of government expenditure on both the 
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production and consumption generated emissions of CO2, in line with other recent studies 
that provide evidence of a non-positive effect of fiscal spending on environmental quality. 
Finally, monetary policy only has an effect on production-generated pollution.  
The quantitative differences and significance levels of the estimated effects of fiscal 
spending on CO2IC and CO2RTC could be attributed to the different mechanisms through 
which the production and consumption generated pollutants are influenced by the different 
macroeconomic policies adopted. For example, for consumption related pollutants 
environmental regulations the use of environmental policies is more difficult as the primary  
tool to reduce these is the implementation of environmental taxes, which are often avoided as 
they are not politically popular.   
 The importance of the analysis is highlighted given the current emphasis on 
expansionary macroeconomic policy as a tool to alleviate the adverse effect of the recent 
economic crisis. In many countries there has been a sharp increase of public expenditure, 
while at the same time the share of public goods in total government expenditure has 
increased with government focusing more on environmental quality as well as health and 
education systems. That said, our results provide evidence that increasing government 
expenditure could render the efforts to improve environmental quality easier and more cost 
efficient than is currently assumed.   
Thus, even if no changes are implemented in environmental regulation and rules, 
increasing the size and composition of fiscal expenditure towards public goods could lead to 
a reduction of, mainly, production- but also consumption-generated pollution. On the other 
hand, if tax-cuts, as recommended by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and expansionary 
monetary policy are to be followed, they should be accompanied by the enforcing appropriate 
environmental regulation, particularly for production-generated pollution, if environmental 
degradation is to be avoided. 
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Further extensions of this analysis could be directed to the examination of the 
relationship between macroeconomic policy and pollution in countries with different 
characteristics than that of the US. In addition, there is a gap in the literature concerning the 
theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy expansions 
on pollution, which could be established taking into account our results and lead to normative 
judgments regarding these relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Bernauer, T., Koubi, V., 2006. States as Providers of Public Goods: How Does Government Size 
Affect Environmental Quality? Available at SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=900487 
Frederik, C., Lundström, S., 2001. Political and Economic Freedom and the Environment: The 
Case of CO2 Emissions. Working Paper in Economics no. 29. University of Gothenburg, 
Gothenburg. 
Fullerton, D., S-R. Kim. 2008, Environmental Investment and Policy with Distortionary Taxes, 
and Endogenous Growth, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 56(2): 
141-154 
Galinato, G.I., Islam, F., 2014. The Challenge of Addressing Consumption Pollutants with Fiscal 
Policy. Working Paper Series WP 2014-1. Washington State University, Washington. 
Grossman, G., Krueger, A., 1995. Economic growth and the environment. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 110: 353–377. 
Halkos, G., 2003. Environmental Kuznets Curve for sulfur: evidence using GMM estimation and 
random coefficient panel data models. Environment and Development Economics 8: 581-
601. 
Halkos, G., 2006. Econometrics: Theory and practice. Giourdas Publications. 
Halkos, G., 2011. Econometrics: Theory and Practice: Instructions in using Eviews, Minitab, 
SPSS and Excel. Gutenberg. 
Halkos, G., Paizanos, E., 2013. The effect of government expenditure on the environment: An 
empirical investigation. Ecological Economics 91: 48-56. 
Heyes, A., 2000. A proposal for the greening of textbook macro: ‘IS-LM-EE’. Ecological 
Economics 32: 1-7. 
 20 
Inmaculada, M.Z., Aurelia, B.M., 2004. Pooled Mean Group Estimation of an Environmental 
Kuznets Curve for CO2. Economic Letters 82: 121-126. 
Islam, F., Lopez, R., 2013. Government Spending and Air Pollution in the US, Working Paper 
13-02, University of Maryland, Maryland.   
Lawn, P.A., 2003. Environmental Macroeconomics: Extending the IS-LM Model to Include an 
‘Environmental Equilibrium’ Curve. Australian Economic Papers 42 (1): 118-134. 
López,R. V. Thomas, Y. Wang. 2008. The Quality of Growth: Fiscal Policies for Better Results, 
IEG Working Paper, 2008. 
Lopez, R., Galinato, G.I, Islam, F., 2011. Fiscal spending and the environment: Theory and 
empirics. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 62: 180-198. 
Lopez, R.E., Palacios, A., 2014. Why has Europe become Environmentally Cleaner? 
Decomposing the Roles of Fiscal, Trade and Environmental Policies. Environmental and 
Resource Economics 58(1): 91-108.   
Lopez, R.E., Palacios, A., 2010. Have Government Spending and Energy Tax Policies 
Contributed to make Europe Environmentally Cleaner? Working Paper 94795. 
University of Maryland, Maryland. 
McAusland, C., 2008. Trade, Politics, and the Environment: Tailpipe vs. Smokestack. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 55(1): 52-71. 
Mountford, A., Uhlig, H., 2009. What are the effects of fiscal policy shocks. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 24: 960-992. 
Sim, N.C.S., 2006. Environmental Keynesian Macroeconomics: Some further discussion. 
Ecological Economics 59: 401-405. 
Zimmerman, Rae, 2005. Mass Transit Infrastructure and Urban Health. Journal of Urban Health 
82(1): 21-32.  
